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ARE SHORT SELLERS STAKEHOLDERS? 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This paper analyses the role of short sellers in the context of stakeholder theory and 
poses the question: should short sellers be considered as stakeholders?  The paper 
examines the conditions under which short sellers operate and how short selling can 
be a profitable activity.  Next the paper considers the view of short sellers from the 
perspective of the finance literature and this perspective is contrasted with concerns 
which are frequently expressed in the news media about the activities of short sellers.  
The constraints on short selling are discussed, together with the phenomenon of 
optimism in analysts’ forecasts which is believed to support ‘high’ share prices.  The 
usefulness of the preceding analysis is then discussed in the context of stakeholder 
theory and the paper discusses some potential policy implications in terms of 
corporate governance and financial reporting. 
 
The paper concludes that short sellers can legitimately be regarded as stakeholders 
and, indeed, encouraging short sellers to operate more effectively in the market as 
well as providing fuller disclosure of their activities could provide a useful anti-dote 
to some of the excessive and unjustified share price rise which have been seen in 
recent years in failing companies. 
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ARE SHORT SELLERS STAKEHOLDERS? 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of a particular interest group, short 
sellers, in relation to stakeholder theory.  In section 2 the paper sets out the conditions 
under which short selling can be a profitable activity.  Section 3 shows how short 
sellers are viewed from the perspective of the finance literature and the paper then 
continues, in section 4, to contrast this perspective with disquiet in the media about 
the activities of short sellers.  Section 5 reviews the related phenomenon of optimism 
in analysts’ forecasts and section 6 discusses the insights into stakeholder theory 
which can be usefully gained from this analysis.  Section 7 provides some conclusions 
and implications for policy making. 
 
The strength of agency theory lies in its focus on two main parties in the operations of 
a firm: namely principals (shareholders) and agents (managers).  In contrast, a main 
contribution of stakeholder theory is that it attempts to move away from what is 
considered to be a too narrow focus on just two parties in the firm and seeks instead to 
examine the relationships between a wider group, extended to include parties such as 
employees, customers, suppliers and government. 
 
It might be argued that a weakness of stakeholder theory is an underlying assumption 
that all parties have the efficient functioning of the firm as a main interest, even 
though conflicts may exist between the different parties.  This paper describes one 
group which is relevant to the firm (at least in terms of a need of access to financial 
information) but which at the same time would benefit the most if the firm were to be 
made bankrupt, that is cease to exist.  In the case of a single firm, and in this extreme 
scenario, short sellers would maximise the return on their ‘investment’ if the shares of 
the firm fell to a zero value.  This paper therefore poses the simple question – are 
short sellers stakeholders?  In seeking to answer this question it is hoped that some 
light can be shed on the nature and usefulness of stakeholder theory in relation to 
corporate governance. 
 
2.  Taking a short position 
 
At this point it is useful to say elaborate on short sellers and short selling.  For 
instance, what do we mean by ‘short selling’? 
 
The basic principles of short selling are (in theory at least) relatively straightforward
1
   
and they can usefully be thought of as the opposite of taking a ‘long’ position.  A long 
position is the traditional view of an investor who purchases, say, shares for cash, and 
at a later date, once the shares have risen in price, can realise a profit by selling them 
in the market.  If one believes, ex-ante, that share prices are likely to fall in the future, 
an individual can always sell shares which are already owned and thereby minimise 
losses caused by a subsequent fall in the share price.  But can individuals actually 
profit from a falling share price?  They are able to do this if they adopt a short 
position.  Thus an investor can request a broker to short N number of shares in 
company C.  The broker carries out the instruction by borrowing N number of shares 
from another client and then selling them in the market.  The short position can be 
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maintained as long as the broker has access to shares which can be borrowed.  
Eventually the investor will close the position by purchasing an equivalent N number 
of shares in the market, so that the purchase and sale of shares is exactly matched.  
The motivation for such a transaction is the investor’s belief that the share price of 
company C will be lower at the time of purchase than it was at the time of sale, thus 
generating a profit.  Note that in the case of a short sale, the ‘sale’ effectively precedes 
the ‘purchase’. 
 
Short selling has been recognised for hundreds of years.  Staley (1997) points out that 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, directors of the Dutch East India 
Company blamed short sellers for sharp declines in the price of the company’s shares 
on the Amsterdam Exchange.  The companys’ directors complained that ‘bear attacks, 
which generally assume the form of  short selling, have caused and continue to cause 
immeasurable damage to innocent stockholders, among whom one will find many 
widows and orphans’ (quoted in Staley, 1997, pp. 235-236).  Short sellers were thus a 
convenient excuse for the company’s problems.  On the other hand the officials of the 
Amsterdam Exchange believed that the declining share price was due to 
unsatisfactory business conditions. This negative attitude to short sellers has persisted 
through the centuries and Shiller (2005, p. 182) refers to the fact that short sellers 
were widely blamed for the US Stock Market crash of 1929. 
 
But in practice, such transactions can present complications.  If at any time the broker 
is unable to borrow sufficient shares, then the investor will be short-squeezed and will 
be forced to close the position.  Any dividend income received by the investor 
between sale and purchase is paid to the broker who passes it back to the original 
owner of the shares.   The investor is also required to open a margin account with the 
broker into which are placed cash or marketable securities.  In the event that the share 
price of company C increases after the sale, then the assets in the margin account will 
need to be increased.  Bailey (2005, p. 14) points out that some regulators allow 
shares to be sold short only when there has been a recent increase in the market price 
(the ‘uptick rule’).  The existence of such restrictions on short sales is said to be 
justified on the grounds that it helps to prevent excessive falls in prices. 
 
But instead of borrowing shares to sell short, it is possible for an investor to benefit 
from future declines in a company share price by using futures or options.
2
   
 
Futures contracts 
 
A futures contract involves two parties who agree to buy and sell an asset at a future 
date.  Note that the transaction price (the futures price) is agreed at the date the futures 
contract is initially agreed.  In the case of company shares, the seller of the futures 
contract agrees to deliver shares (the ‘underlying’) to the buyer of the futures contract 
at the settlement date (delivery date) and at the futures price.  The seller of the futures 
contract will make a profit if the share price at the settlement date is lower than the 
futures price.  The reason is that, at the settlement date, the seller of the futures 
contract can buy an equivalent number of shares (at the lower price) to deliver to the 
buyer of the futures contract.  On the other hand, the seller of the futures contract will 
make a loss if the share price at the settlement date is higher than the futures price.  
The seller of the futures contract will be forced to buy an equivalent number of shares 
(at the higher price) to deliver to the buyer of the futures contract. 
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Options 
 
As an alternative to short selling or agreeing a futures contract, an individual can take 
advantage of a fall in future equity prices by buying a put option or selling a call 
option.  The options can be European options or American options.  A European 
option can be exercised only on the date on which the contract expires.  On the other 
hand, an American option can be exercised at any time up to the date on which the 
contract expires.  The distinction between European and American options is not 
particularly material for this discussion, and for ease of exposition, the following 
illustrations are based on European options. 
 
Buying a put option 
 
A put option gives the holder the right (but does not impose an obligation) to sell 
shares (the underlying) at a specified price (the strike price or exercise price) in the 
future.  Assume that an individual buys a put option for a single company share where 
the option price is $2 and the strike price is $20.  Immediately on buying the option 
the buyer pays to the seller the option price of $2.  Suppose that the market price then 
falls to $1 at the expiration date.  It will be to the advantage of the holder of the option 
to exercise the option and realise a profit of $17 calculated as $20 - $2 - $1.  The 
maximum profit the holder of the option can make is the strike price minus the option 
price, minus the cost of purchasing a share at the prevailing market price (at the 
expiration date).  The maximum loss the holder of the option can incur is the option 
price ($2). 
 
Selling a call option 
 
Alternatively, an individual can take advantage of a future fall in share prices by 
selling a call option.  Selling a call option means that the buyer of the option has the 
right (but not the obligation) to purchase the company share in the future.  Therefore, 
the seller (writer) of the call option may be called on to sell the share in the future if 
the buyer (holder) of the option decides to exercise the option.  Assume that an 
individual sells a call option for a single company share with a strike price of $20 and 
an option price of $2.  Immediately on writing the option, the seller receives $2.  
Suppose that the market price then falls to $1 at the expiration date.  It will not be to 
the advantage of the holder of the option to exercise the option since this would imply 
buying a share at $20 when it could be bought in the market for $1.  Thus the option 
will not be exercised and the seller will keep the option price of $2.  Thus the 
maximum profit the seller can make is the option price ($2).  On the other hand, the 
maximum loss is (in theory) unlimited since it will be calculated as the share market 
price at the expiration date minus the strike price minus the option price.  Assume that 
at the expiration date the market price of the share has increased to $200.  It will be to 
the advantage of the holder to exercise the option and make a profit of $178 
calculated as $200 - $20 - $2.  The seller of the call option will make a loss of $178, 
also calculated as $200 - $20 - $2. 
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Contrasting futures and options 
 
A main difference between futures contracts and options is that in the case of futures 
contracts, both buyers and sellers are fully committed to fulfilling their part of the 
bargain.  In the case of options, however, the buyer of the option must pay the option 
price to the seller of the option, but the buyer is under no obligation to exercise the 
option unless it is to their advantage.  But if the buyer of the option chooses to 
exercise, then the seller must fulfil their part of the bargain. 
 
3.  How are short sellers viewed in the finance literature? 
 
Miller (2004) shows that shares can potentially be overpriced because of the 
regulatory restrictions on short selling.  This is because prices are likely to be set by 
optimistic investors (taking a long position) rather than by less optimistic investors 
(taking a short position).  In terms of efficient markets, unfavourable opinions are 
therefore prevented from being fully reflected in share prices.  Miller argues that 
mainstream finance theory assumes that investors can take short positions as easily as 
they can take long positions.  But in practice, in a world of informed and uninformed 
investors, the informed investors will not hold sufficient quantities of overpriced 
shares such that their trading would eliminate overpricing.  So, although underpricing 
is not possible, overpricing will exist.  Because of the obstacles to short selling, the 
implication is that ‘there will be some overvalued stocks that can be identified with 
publicly available information’ (Miller, 2004, p. 82).  Restrictions on short selling 
imply that many overvalued stocks will be excluded from the portfolios of informed 
investors.  Prices of these stocks will be set by the most optimistic investors, not by 
the typical investor (Miller, 2004, p. 114). 
 
Lamont (2004) also refers to the obstacles faced by investors who wish to sell short: 
 
US equity markets are not set up to make shorting easy.  Regulations and 
procedures administered by the SEC, the Federal Reserve, the various stock 
exchanges, underwriters and individual brokerage firms can mechanically 
impede short selling.  Legal and institutional constraints inhibit or prevent 
investors from selling short (most mutual funds are long only).  We have many 
institutions set up to encourage individuals to buy stocks, but few institutions 
set up to encourage them to short.  The growth of hedge funds is a welcome 
correction to this imbalance’.  (Lamont, 2004, p. 182). 
 
Lamont refers to attempts from Napoleon onwards to prevent or restrict the activities 
of short sellers, and the harassment faced by short sellers, usually in times of crisis or 
following major price declines. 
 
The events following September 11, 2001 are consistent with this pattern.  
Following a major terrorist attack on the United States, the SEC and various 
other regulatory bodies investigated the claim that terrorists had shorted stocks 
or had bought puts, armed with foreknowledge of the attacks.  This 
investigation turned up no evidence of terrorist shorting.  As far as [Lamont 
knows], there is no evidence that Osama bin Laden, the Kaiser, Stalin, or any 
other major villain ever shorted stock’. (Lamont, 2004, p. 183). 
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Jones and Larsen (2004, p. 206) point out that short selling of stocks which are 
thought to be overpriced has the potential to improve mean portfolio returns.  In 
addition, the opportunity to short sell can effectively double the number of assets, 
which gives the potential to reduce portfolio variance. 
 
Angel et al (2003) refer to the view of many practitioners who believe that short 
selling occurs infrequently in the NASDAQ or any US market.  The reason is that 
‘such a risky, costly strategy attracts mainly the well-informed and aggressive, who 
short stock only when they expect large returns’ (Angel et al, 2003, p. 67).  Based on 
NASDAQ data in 2000, Angel et al find that short sales occur on average in 
approximately 1 in every 42 trades and involve 1 in every 35 shares traded.  They also 
find that short selling occurs more often on actively traded shares.  It is worth noting 
that the most actively traded shares are likely to be those of the largest and most well 
known companies.  In addition, the finding that only a very small proportion of share 
trades involve short sales, means that short sales as a proportion of total issued share 
capital is probably extremely small.  Hence it would seem that short sellers are likely 
to have very little downward influence on share prices for the market as a whole. 
 
Dechow et al (2001, p. 78) find a strong relation between the trading strategies of 
short sellers and ratios of fundamentals to market prices.  They also find that short 
sellers target securities with low fundamental-to-price ratios and then unwind their 
positions as these ratios revert to normal levels.  The evidence from Angel et al (2003) 
and Dechow (2001) is consistent with short sellers being informed investors who are 
able to pursue successful investment strategies. 
 
Can the profits made by short sellers be justified?  Choie and Hwang (1994) argue 
that short sellers have a rightful claim to profit since they deserve a reward for 
enhancing the efficiency of the stock market (Choie and Hwang, 1994, p. 33).  
‘Without short sellers, the market could become structurally biased against the ability 
to distinguish weeds from grass because many institutional investors are prohibited, 
legally or otherwise, from shorting stocks even if they know a firm is engaging in 
accounting gimmickry or fraud’.  Also ‘short sellers, as a group, consistently make a 
substantial profit, and a majority of their positions yield a profit’ (1994, p. 33). 
 
Christophe et al (2004) report evidence that in the majority of cases they investigated, 
post-announcement stock return was negative following unusually high short selling.  
They recommend that investors should be more fully informed of unusual short 
selling activity in order to facilitate more orderly price movements and more efficient 
incorporation of private information into stock prices.  They therefore conclude that 
financial market rulemakers might consider requiring more extensive and timely 
public disclosures of short selling (2004, p. 1874).  However, an alternative (and 
perhaps more contentious)  interpretation of their results would be that market 
regulators should in fact ease some of the obstructions to short selling, thereby 
helping to facilitate the activities of short sellers. 
 
Aitken et al (1998) report evidence based on short sales on the Australian stock 
exchange and conclude that ‘in a market environment in which short sales are fully 
transparent moments after execution, they are almost instantaneously bad news’ 
(1998, p. 2206).  Aitken et al argue that an absence of transparent short sales may 
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potentially inhibit the market’s ability to impound relevant information (1998, p. 
2222). 
 
In summary, the view from the finance literature seems to be that short sellers do tend 
to be successful, there is little reason for regulators to restrict their activities and in 
fact there are grounds for believing that releasing increased information to the markets 
about their activities is likely to improve market efficiency. 
 
 
4.  Disquiet in the media about the activities of short sellers  
 
The news media, on the other hand, do not always take such a charitable view of the 
activities of short sellers.  Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, there 
was a marked increase in the number of stories in the media about the activities of 
short sellers and their consequences for stock markets.  Table 1 compares the number 
of stories in the UK and US news media for periods before and after 11 September 
2001.  These data are taken from the LexisNexis Executive database.  The search term 
used was ‘short seller’ and the UK news media represents a wide range of media, 
mainly newspapers, such as the Financial Times, The Times, The Independent, The 
Daily Telegraph, The Daily Mail, Sunday Express etc.  US news media again 
represents mainly newspapers such as The New York Times, The New York Post, The 
Washington Post, The San Francisco Chronicle, The Seattle Times, The Boston Globe 
etc. 
 
Table 1 
 
Number of news stories in UK and US news media before and after 11 
September 2001 
 
Days UK US Days UK US 
Before News News After News News 
7 5 7 7 9 19 
14 9 12 14 32 35 
21 14 20 21 40 44 
28 18 27 28 59 57 
60 30 51 60 72 83 
90 48 72 90 85 117 
 
Source: UK and US news media stories based on Lexis-Nexis Executive database. 
 
For UK news media, stories about short sellers were averaging about 5 per week in 
the days leading up to 11 September 2001, while stories in the US media were 
averaging about 7 per week. 
 
After 11 September 2001 the picture changed substantially.  In the UK, in the first 
few days after the attacks, the number of stories began to increase and by weeks two, 
three and four after 11 September 2001 the weekly average of stories was running at 
about three times higher than before 11 September 2001.  By the second and third 
months after 11 September 2001, the number of stories had more or less returned to 
the ‘before’ levels. 
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In the US, the news media were somewhat quicker to jump on the short seller 
bandwagon and in the first week after 11 September the number of news stories 
nearly tripled, compared with the ‘before’ levels.  The first 28 days after 11 
September 2001 saw over twice as many stories compared to ‘before’.  In months two 
and three after 11 September 2001, the experience was similar to that of the UK and 
the number of news stories began to return to the ‘before’ levels. 
 
In the UK news media, 18 stories appeared in the 28 days before 11 September which 
contained the term ‘short seller’.  Many of the articles were relatively objective about 
the activities of short sellers.  A few were more critical, such as the report
3
 in the 
Sunday Business which referred to ‘the “cyber smear”, usually practised by “short” 
sellers – investors who sell borrowed securities in the expectation that prices will fall 
– to drive down a stock price on the basis of false information’.  But in none of the 18 
articles was the word ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ mentioned. 
 
In the first few days following 11 September 2001, some stories did mention the 
terms ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ together with the term ‘short seller’ but these stories 
were often based on views that it might be unpatriotic to sell short in the (then) 
unusual circumstances.  Also stories took a view that destabilisation of financial 
markets could be an objective of terrorists.  Moreover there were stories to the effect 
that some leading investment banks, under pressure from regulators, had placed a ban 
on short selling in order to try to stabilise the markets and prevent a massive sell off 
of shares.  Stories also discussed the possibility of economic recession and the Sunday 
Times in a report
4
 on 16 September 2001 referred to recent profit warnings from Ford 
and General Electric blaming the terrorist attacks.  But it might be asked whether 
these profit warnings used the terrorist attacks as a convenient excuse in order to 
distract attention from more fundamental and long term commercial problems. 
 
But it was not until 18 September 2001 that an article in The Guardian made the 
connection that terrorists might actually have benefited from short sales of shares, 
especially in companies in the airline or insurance industry.
5
  From then on the story 
was taken up in other newspapers.  For example, on 23 September 2001, in a Sunday 
Times article
6
 headlined ‘Terror insiders may have made millions from stocks’ it was 
suggested that unusually high levels of short selling took place before 11 September 
2001 in companies such as American Airlines and insurance companies such as AXA 
and Swiss Re.  The article also suggested (quoting ‘German authorities’) that the 
terrorist organisers could have made big profits by trading in oil and gold 
(commodities which would have been expected to increase in price following 11 
September 2001).  This raised the possibility that the terrorist organisers were not 
only buying long (oil and gold) but also selling short (airline and insurance stocks).  If 
true, this would have represented a fairly sophisticated finance operation. 
However, the Sunday Times article of 23 September 2001 acknowledged that the US 
airline industry was already experiencing financial problems before 11 September 
2001 and a Financial Times report
7
 of 22 September 2001 stated that many hedge 
funds were already betting on a fall in equity markets even before 11 September 2001.  
So there may have been a perfectly innocent explanation for the apparently high 
levels of speculative activity before 11 September 2001. 
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Despite reports that a number of regulatory authorities in different parts of the world 
began investigating irregular investment activities which occurred around 11 
September 2001, it appears (consistent with the view of Lamont, 2004, cited above) 
that no concrete evidence has been produced to date of short sales of stock by 
terrorists. 
 
5.  Optimism in analysts’ forecasts 
 
As mentioned above, there seems to be sound evidence that short sellers are able to 
operate successfully.  One explanation for this fact might be found in a view of 
markets which argues that, although markets may be efficient in the long run, they are 
not necessarily efficient in the short run.  One area of research in the finance literature 
has focused on the activities of analysts who forecast company earnings and there is a 
substantial body of empirical research relating to the area of optimism in analysts’ 
forecasts.   
 
Kothari (2001, p. 153) in his review of capital markets research in accounting refers to 
the problems of apparent optimism in analysts’ forecasts.  Research by Lim (2001, p. 
383) suggests that analysts following poorly performing companies refrain from fully 
revising their estimates downwards and this can lead to greater positive bias.  In 
addition, Lim finds that analysts working with smaller brokerage firms produce more 
optimistic forecasts.   
 
Although the literature appears to have reached a consensus on the evidence for 
optimism in analysts’ forecasts, what is more debatable is the motivation for such 
optimism.  There are at least two plausible explanations for the optimism.  Firstly, one 
possible explanation is that analysts could have an incentive to issue optimistic 
forecasts in return for services provided by the corporate finance section of an 
investment banking firm.  Another possible explanation is that analysts might issue 
optimistic forecasts in order to gain increased access to information from 
management. 
 
McNichols and O’Brien (1997) find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
analysts report selectively when they have relatively favourable information.  Thus 
analysts will tend to drop coverage of firms for which they have pessimistic 
expectations.  On the other hand they will initiate coverage for firms about which they 
have optimistic expectations.  McNichols and O’Brien argue that their evidence ‘is at 
least a partial explanation for the commonly observed phenomenon that analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings are generally and persistently overoptimistic’ (1997, p. 197). 
 
Dugar and Nathan (1995, pp. 132-133) find evidence that ‘analysts who issue research 
reports on companies that are also investment banking clients of their brokerage firm 
(investment banker analysts) tend to be more optimistic in their earnings forecasts 
relative to other analysts (noninvestment banker analysts)’.  Moreover, Dugar and 
Nathan find that investment banker analysts are more optimistic in their investment 
recommendations, relative to noninvestment banker analysts.  
 
Finally, the threat of legal action by a company may make analysts cautious about 
issuing a pessimistic forecast or recommendation.    In the case of the collapse of 
Robert Maxwell’s business empire in 1991 (see Wearing, 2005, p. 34), it later 
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transpired that some analysts who had tried to warn of Maxwell’s business activities 
had been subjected to threats of legal action.  An analyst, who worked for Phillips and 
Drew, wrote a sell notice on MCC shares in 1989 and as a result Maxwell withdrew 
£80 million of the MCC pension fund from Phillips and Drew Fund Management, 
making a point of saying that it was due to the analyst’s criticisms.  In 1997 
WorldCom gave Salomon Smith Barney the exclusive right to administer the 
WorldCom stock option plan.  Jack Grubman, an analyst with Salomon Smith Barney 
was an enthusiastic supporter of WorldCom and continued to rate WorldCom’s stock 
as a buy even when the share price was falling after 1999.  In May 2004 Citigroup 
(which controlled Salomon Smith Barney) announced that it would pay $2.65 billion 
to settle an investor lawsuit which had alleged that Jack Grubman ‘had deliberately 
painted too positive a picture of WorldCom’s prospects before an accounting 
misstatement drove it into bankruptcy’.8 
 
In 2002 LVMH sued Morgan Stanley on grounds of bias and defamation in a French 
court.  In 2006 the French court of appeal overturned a lower court finding of bias but 
upheld the defamation finding on the grounds that Morgan Stanley did not properly 
disclose its corporate relationships.  As argued in a Financial Times editorial ‘ … it is 
absurd to allow a company to sue a critical analyst for defamation … analysts need no 
encouragement to puff up shares, since nobody is likely to contest a glowing report’.9 
 
 
6.  The relevance of short sellers to stakeholder theory 
 
Stakeholder theory stresses the importance of all parties who are affected either 
directly or indirectly by a firm’s operations.  The term ‘stakeholder’ is normally seen 
as referring to any party who has a ‘stake’ in the company, and while this can 
obviously include the shareholders and directors (principal and agent in agency 
theory) it can also include parties such as employees, government, customers, 
suppliers, bankers etc.  Indeed the list can be extended to include the general public if 
it is accepted that a firm can affect the public through its actions on the environment.  
But note that Sternberg (1997) has criticised stakeholder theory as being incompatible 
with corporate governance and argues that the number of groups identified as 
stakeholders has increased dramatically to the point where the term is no longer 
meaningful for analysis.  ‘Stakeholder theory provides no effective standard against 
which corporate agents can be judged.  Balancing stakeholder interests is an ill-
defined notion, which cannot serve as an objective performance measure; managers 
responsible for interpreting as well as implementing it are effectively left free to 
pursue their own arbitrary ends’ (1997: 5). 
 
On the other hand supporters of stakeholder theory such as Blair (1995) argue that  
‘Boards must understand that they are the representatives of all the important 
stakeholders in the firm – all those whose investments in physical or human capital 
are at risk.  Thus, individuals who explicitly represent critical stakeholders should be 
put on boards, to give those stakeholders some assurance that their interests will be 
taken into account’ (Blair, 1995: 326).  Although Blair acknowledges that conflicts of 
interest could result, these conflicts could be reduced by ensuring that all stakeholders 
received an equity stake proportional to their firm-specific investments.  The 
conventional wisdom is that shareholders receive dividends and capital gains as a 
reward for risking their investment in a company (although modern finance theory 
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shows that firm specific risk can be reduced through portfolio diversification).  But 
stakeholder theory makes the important point that employees also risk their capital, 
that is human capital, when they work for a firm.  Under stakeholder theory this is just 
as important an investment as financial capital and one could argue that employees 
are not in a position to reduce their risk through diversification. 
 
In order to make a compelling case for short sellers to be considered as stakeholders, 
the traditional view of stakeholder theory (as advanced by Blair) would need to be 
modified.  Nevertheless, a case can be argued on the grounds that the activities of 
short sellers can be seen as beneficial to a company in the long run and their actions 
could, conceivably help to prevent corporate collapse.  Indeed, it could be argued that 
fewer constraints on short sellers in cases such as Enron and WorldCom in the US and 
possibly Maxwell and other cases in the UK might have prevented unreasonably 
inflated share prices and could have limited the losses of some shareholders, 
especially those who were encouraged to buy at the peak. 
 
It cannot be denied that if short sellers are to operate effectively then they need access 
to financial information of equivalent quality to that demanded by traditional 
shareholders, institutional investors and banks etc.  This would seem to indicate that 
short sellers have rights to information commensurate with other, recognised 
stakeholders. 
 
Gamble and Kelly (2001) argue in favour of corporate pluralism and a more formal 
recognition in company governance of the investment and risks incurred by 
stakeholders (not just shareholders).  ‘The corporate pluralism position on the 
company in the stakeholding debate proposes to acknowledge the pluralistic structure 
of the modern company by changing the legal framework to accommodate it.  The 
strength of this perspective is that it offers a way to make the company both more 
efficient and more legitimate’ (Gamble and Kelly, 2001: 115).  Such a view would 
seem to apply equally well in the case of short sellers, since it acknowledges a 
changing financial environment in which short sellers would be recognised as 
performing a positive role in the market. 
 
This view is also consistent with Jensen (2001) who argues for a modified approach to 
agency theory and comes down in favour of enlightened value maximisation and 
enlightened stakeholder theory.  In the long run, for a firm to be successful, ‘managers 
must pay attention to all constituencies that can affect the firm’ (Jensen, 2001: 304).  
In other words, for a firm to be successful and survive it needs to address the needs of 
all its stakeholders.   
 
In a stakeholder framework, the problem is somewhat more complex because of the 
added dimension of conflicts between the various stakeholders.  Hill and Jones 
acknowledge that, although the different groups may have competing claims (for 
example increased wages would be incompatible with increased dividends, other 
things being equal), nevertheless, ‘on a more general level, each group can be seen as 
having a stake in the continued existence of the firm (Hill and Jones, 1992: 145).  And 
this is perhaps the important point, the long term survival of the firm and therefore the 
long term survival of all the stakeholders.  Although this might seem to be an anomaly 
in the case of short sellers, in fact, short sellers are only a symptom of the problem; 
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the real cause of company failure (the point at which short sellers maximise their 
return) is far more likely to lie with ineffective or even corrupt management. 
 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) point to the growing debate over the role of 
stakeholders in the academic and professional management literature and argue that 
the critical underpinning for stakeholder theory is its normative base.  In other words, 
stakeholder theory is a theory about what should be, and not necessarily what is.  This 
is an interesting point, since it seems plausible to argue that shareholder theory has 
evolved out of financial economics, using conventional ‘positive’ analysis, whereas 
stakeholder theory is more strongly embedded in a tradition of moral and 
philosophical rights of stakeholders.  The efficiency argument is perhaps easier to 
make for shareholder theory than it is for stakeholder theory, but we should not forget 
that both shareholder theory and stakeholder theory have normative elements.  
Donaldson and Preston (1995: 87) conclude with their belief that ‘the ultimate 
justification for the stakeholder theory is to be found in its normative base.  The plain 
truth is that the most prominent alternative to the stakeholder theory (i.e. the 
“management serving the shareowners” theory) is morally untenable’. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Would a reduction in the constraints on short sellers lead to a disastrous fall in share 
prices?  On the contrary; where share prices are unreasonably higher than economic 
fundamentals would dictate, the activities of short sellers would increase up to the 
point where share prices are forced into line with economic fundamentals.  At this 
point, investors taking a ‘long’ position would find their activities more profitable and 
the activities of short sellers would become less profitable or loss making. 
 
In this paper, the fact that a case can be made for short sellers to be considered as a 
legitimate stakeholder group actually serves to strengthen the claims of stakeholder 
theory as a valid and inclusive model for corporate governance.  Short sellers would 
seem to have legitimate information needs and require information of a similar quality 
to traditional shareholders, institutional investors and banks. 
 
The positive view of short sellers and their activities which is put forward here 
envisages a scenario where short sellers effectively act as a safety valve for 
companies in distress.  Instead of curbing their activities (which only exacerbates the 
problem) short sellers should be encouraged, in order to bring share prices back to 
realistic levels.  Short sellers effectively act as an antidote to ‘irrational exuberance’10 
in the economy. 
 
One of the problems with the current situation is that there are arguably too many 
vested interests in favour of relentlessly increasing share prices.  These vested 
interests include government (who often see buoyant share markets as an indicator of 
economic success), life assurance companies and pension funds (who need to satisfy 
the claims of their clients) and companies themselves who need a buoyant share price 
in order to attract additional funding and reduce their costs of finance. 
 
In the case of WorldCom it was reported that even short-sellers, who had been 
profiting in the market from WorldCom’s falling share price were surprised at the 
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scale of the accounting disclosures.  The New York Times quotes one short-seller as 
saying that investors cheered WorldCom’s acquisition binge when its stock was rising 
and paid little attention to how the company generated its profits.  That attitude 
encouraged the company to stretch accounting rules and take ever-bigger risks in an 
effort to keep its stock rising, and ‘the executives, the money managers, the auditors, 
the CFOs, the CEOs, the ones that got ahead were the most reckless, the least 
ethical’.11 
 
Chief executives can be quick to criticise short sellers for bringing about the collapse 
of their companies, but less ready to acknowledge that short sellers can only make 
abnormal profits when company shares are unreasonably overpriced.  Kenneth Lay 
who created Enron was convicted in May 2006 on charges of fraud and conspiracy in 
connection with the Enron bankruptcy in 2001.  But in his defence Lay chose to 
portray Enron as a successful company which failed as a result of sceptical news 
reports and aggressive short selling by hedge funds which led to a collapse in investor 
confidence.
12
  Such a defence may be consistent with media hype, but less in line with 
research conducted in the finance literature. 
 
So should short sellers be encouraged or discouraged?  The conclusion from this 
paper is that encouraging short sellers to operate is likely to enhance corporate 
governance and improve the efficient operation of markets.  This in turn leads to the 
conclusion that regulators might usefully consider how restrictions on short selling 
can reasonably be relaxed, and what further information might be provided to the 
markets, via the financial statements, which would indicate the level of activity of 
short sellers in the market.  Financial reporting could usefully include data on the 
level of activity by short sellers in a company’s shares.  This would provide relevant 
information to stakeholders such as traditional ‘long’ investors, debt providers, 
employees and regulators to help form a judgement about whether a particular 
company’s shares are unreasonably overpriced in relation to other comparable firms 
in the market. 
 
Encouraging short sellers to operate more effectively in the market as well as 
providing fuller disclosure of their activities could provide a useful anti-dote to some 
of the excessive and unjustified share price rise which have been seen in recent years 
in failing companies. 
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